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  Integrationist reflections on the place of dialogue in our communicational  
  universe: laying the ghost of segregationism?   
 
    Peter E Jones 
   Sheffield Hallam University 
 
Roy Harris identifies the “main flaw” in J L Austin's account of language as a “failure to 
consider to what extent being able to ‘do things with words’ is parasitic on being able to do 
things without them”. Harris's comment here serves as a springboard for a critical evaluation 
of communicational theories based around “talk-in-interaction” or dialogic principles. The 
primacy thereby given to linguistic interaction arguably entails a mystification of 
communication processes and the dis-integration of the social world into which our 
communicational experiences are intervowen. Consequently, the ghost of segregationism, in 
the shape of Harris’s “fallacy of verbalism”, continues to haunt, at times faintly, at times 
aggressively, the assumptions and methodologies of the approaches in question. 
 




As Linell (2009) demonstrates, “dialogical” approaches occupy substantial territory in the 
human sciences far beyond the claim of any ordinary notion of dialogue. “Dialogism”, he 
argues, “is first and foremost a meta-theoretical framework for the human sciences”, “a 
general epistemology and/or ontology for sociocultural (human) phenomena: semiosis, 
cognition, communication, discourse, consciousness, action in the world, i.e., for the social, 
cultural and human sciences and arts” (2009, 28). Under this capacious intellectual umbrella 
are a range of highly articulated systems of thinking, including Linell’s own, the 
ethnomethodological Conversation Analysis tradition, and the “Theory of Dialogic Action 
Games” or “Mixed Game Model” (“MGM”) of Edda Weigand. 
 
 An obvious question arises about the rationale for elevating dialogue, with its culture-
specific ideological and metalinguistic (literary) baggage, to such theoretical and 
metaphysical heights within the human sciences (and neuroscience, cf Linell, 2009). Linell 
 acknowledges that in “dialogical theorising” “we adopt a more abstract interpretation of the 
term ‘dialogue’” which does not “assign exclusive relevance to linguistic interaction” (2009, 
28). “Nonetheless”, he concedes, “the metaphor of dialogue, which is central to dialogism, 
has of course its source in precisely these more concrete forms of dialogue between human 
beings” (2009, 28). Consequently, we may “use talk-in-interaction as a model and a 
metaphor”, though Linell warns against taking particular forms or genres of talk as “prime 
examples of ‘dialogue’ for theoretical purposes” (2009, 28), since these concrete instances 
“cannot be taken as generally valid models of human dialogue” (2009, 28). The question 
remains, however, as to why linguistic interaction should be taken at all, however abstractly, 
as a “model” or “metaphor” for communication more generally, let alone for the totality of 
human activity which Linell’s approach embraces. The purpose of this paper, then, is to 
suggest some of the pitfalls which attend the dialogic démarche and, in particular, the 
consequences for our understanding of social life from “giving one form of discourse about 
society priority over any other” (Harris 1996, 32). Framing the study of communicational 
activity in a dialogistic metalanguage, I will argue, represents a version of the “fallacy of 
verbalism” (Harris 1996, 25), that is “the tacit but widespread assumption that signs in all 
forms of communication must somehow operate like words” (1996, 25). 
 
2. Conversation Analysis 
 
In (“ethnomethodological”) Conversation Analysis (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2004), we have a 
whole tradition of communicational research built from ways of examining language use 
(“talk-in-interaction”) as a self-contained object of study. From an integrationist perspective 
(Harris 1996, 18), of course, the restriction in principle of analytical attention to “talk” and, 
consequently, to settings exclusively in which “talk” occurs, effects a de facto abstraction or 
segregation of language from communicational experience, whatever insights about the 
integrational proficiencies of conversational participants such study has brought.1   
 
 CA arose as a method of sociological, rather than linguistic, enquiry into lay methods 
of ordering and organizing everyday interactions. But there is something ironical in the 
critical stance taken by CA pioneers towards other sociological traditions. As Silverman 
(1998, 47) explains: “both Durkheim and Goffman take for granted some social ‘reality’ to 
                                                          
1
 Cf Taylor and Cameron (1987); see also Schegloff (1992) for an acknowledgement, if not a response to, their 
critique. 
 which people respond (such as ‘suicide’) or describe a process (such as ‘labelling’) identified 
on the basis of tacit commonsense reasoning. Their common failing is, as Sacks puts it, that 
they work with ‘undescribed categories’”. “Sacks’s problem”, as Silverman puts it, “is to find 
a way to build a sociology that does better than this. In some way, sociology must free itself 
from the ‘commonsense perspective’ …employed in its use of ‘undescribed categories’. For 
Sacks, the solution is to view such categories ‘as features of social life which sociology must 
treat as subject matter’ rather than as ‘sociological resources’” (1998, 16). 
 
 The irony lies in the fact that CA practitioners, from Sacks on, have naïvely and 
unreflectingly placed their own “undescribed categories” at the foundation of their analytical 
approach in the shape of their “commonsense perspective” on language itself. That is, they 
have taken for granted – in identifying, transcribing and interpreting “talk” – the social 
“reality” of language, signally failing to acknowledge, let alone scrutinise, their “ability” as 
“members of society” “to see things in common” (Silverman 1998, 47), linguistically 
speaking. CA, therefore, presents a communication model founded on the unexamined 
linguistic reflexivity of the linguistic analyst (Harris 1998, 25).2 Such a model in itself is 
segregationist, Harris argues since “it presupposes that linguistic inquiry – and linguistic 
theory in general – can somehow be divorced from a consideration of the particular 
circumstances in which it arises and the conditions of linguistic reflexivity which make it 
possible” (1998,  26) - in effect a challenge to all approaches to language and dialogue. 
 
 Interestingly, CA proponents have rationalized their stand alone methodology by 
invoking macro-sociological analogies: “The turn-taking model begins from the idea that 
turns in conversation are resources which, like goods in in an economy, are distributed in 
systematic ways among speakers” (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2004, 47). But it would be a 
curious world indeed if turns actually were “goods” in this sense, that is, if they had “value” 
independently of their role in some ongoing communication process. There is, after all, no 
measurable cost of production to utterances and no scarcity to them. It might have occurred to 
scholars who take such an economic metaphor seriously that the first thing to explore is not 
the distribution of “turns-at-talk” in conversation but the distribution (absence as well as 
presence) of talk itself across contexts, activities (including conversation) and activity spheres 
(including the economy). Instead, as a discipline devoted to a supposed “economy” of talk-in-
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 For internal disagreements over reflexivity within the ethnomethodological camp, see Silverman (1998). 
 interaction, CA has in effect become a kind of  “commonsense” linguistic sociology cut off 
from more general sociological enquiry.  
 
 Perhaps the “’most powerful device for relating utterances’” within the CA 
“economy” is the “adjacency relationship” (Sacks in Silverman 1998, 105-106) or “adjacency 
pair”, pertaining to “questions and answers; greetings and return greetings; or invitations and 
acceptances/declinations” (Hutchby and Woofffitt 2004, 39). This “most powerful device”, 
however, is neither a causal mechanism nor an expression of mental states but has, rather, a 
“normative character” (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2004, 42): “Adjacency pairs thus constitute a 
powerful normative framework for the assessment of interlocutors’ actions and motives by 
producers of first parts” (Hutchby and Wooffitt 2004, 43). In invoking “norms”, therefore, 
CA practitioners are appealing to “macrosocial factors”, that is, factors relating to “practices 
established in the community or some group within the community” (Harris 1996, 26), a 
point which will be of particular significance when considering the dialogism of Linell and 
Weigand. However, the question of how such norms might come to be established appears to 
have a low priority in CA work.   
 
 As a second line of defence of their single minded focus on talk, CA scholars have 
elevated the status of talk itself to that of “a primordial site of sociality on the one hand and, 
on the other hand, one of the (largely presupposed) preconditions for, and achievements of, 
organized social life” (Schegloff 1992, 1296). Accordingly, CA is presented as “’[a] most 
remarkable inventive and productive account of how to study human sociality’” (Sacks in 
Silverman 1998, 196). Schegloff in particular has argued the relevance of CA methodology, 
with its attendant conception of “intersubjectivity”, to other (non linguistic) social practices 
and processes (Schegloff 1992), the specific import being “that activities and their 
organization can be, and should be, studied locally (that is, in the environments of their 
natural occurrence) and through the detailed examination of the indigenous practices through 
which it is (or they are) composed” (1992, 1341). There is no reason to denigrate the 
fascinating, and important, studies of the situated, creative deployment of integrational 
proficiencies by participants in locally managed activity contexts (e.g, Drew and Heritage 
1992). However, in this exclusive focus on local activities as self-contained arenas for 
interactionally managed “intersubjectivity” (Schegloff 1992) or professional “transparency” 
(Goodwin 1996), there is a danger that each such activity becomes a kind of 
 communicational “objet trouvé”, that is, a game cut loose – segregated - from its connections 
to wider social life. For the integrationist, this methodological focus on the local is at best 
one-sided since it requires that analytic attention is directed solely to what Harris (1996) 
refers to as “internal” as opposed to “external” integrational considerations.3 Thus, in relation 
to his analysis of a particular ritual (the Anglican marriage ceremony in the UK), Harris 
observes:   
 
“The matters raised fall into two main categories, which might appropriately be called 
external integration and internal integration. Under the first head falls everything 
which relates to the ways in which this particular ritual is integrated with other 
macrosocial practices (through the various constraints which it imposes on and 
latitude which it allows the participants). Under the second head falls everything 
which relates to the ways in which various features of the ritual are integrated with 
one another so as to articulate a total procedure which makes sense” (1996,  88-89).  
 
 One key implication of Harris’s distinction is that a study of the internal “sense” that 
the participants procedurally make of their local practice will not reveal the “sense” (the 
communicational value) that this local practice (and its ingredients) has in its relation to those 
external practices which it presupposes and to which it contributes, whether the participants 
are aware of this or not. In other words, the commonsense rationality and intelligibility (as it 
appears to the participants) internal to the local practice may contrast sharply with the 
unintelligibility – if not irrationality – of the practice itself taken in a wider context. We may, 
for instance, easily manage the internal sense-making required of us in ordering and paying 
for a meal in a café (Jones 2017) while the question as to why the goods and services on offer 
have this particular monetary value – indeed why they have any monetary value at all – may 
remain an unexamined mystery which can only be addressed through understanding patterns 
and flows of external integration which are beyond our individual experience altogether. 
And, of course, much the same could be said of all aspects of our social life. 
 
 All in all, one might say, therefore, that the academic attention paid to talk-in-
interaction in its own right within the CA tradition  – with all its undoubted insights – has two 
unfortunate consequences. Firstly, concentrating on talk is a way of not paying attention, and 
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 Indeed, Harris refers to integrationism as “a study of the internal and external integration of communication 
processes”  (1996,  90). 
 certainly not critical attention (cf. Jones 2017), to the wider social organization in which talk 
plays its part. Secondly, and conversely, the cost of spreading the application of the 
methodological procedures of CA to social activity more broadly may be the fragmentation 
of social order into the salami-sliced internally-integrated “local” activities which those 
procedures are designed to cope with.  
  
 
3. Per Linell’s dialogism 
 
Linell’s dialogical approach is explicitly built around an “abstract” or metaphorical notion of 
dialogue: “one might say that dialogism uses talk-in-interaction (dialogue in a concrete 
sense…) as a model and metaphor (or metonymy) for human communication and cognition 
in general” (2009, 27). Furthermore, the reason given for taking talk as the starting point is 
that: “Talk (in interaction) is the primordial form of human communication” (2009, 27). In 
according such a “primordial” status to talk, Linell’s dialogical approach has, as a 
consequence, significant common ground with CA, despite Linell’s cogent criticisms of its 
scope and methodology (2009,  413-414).  
 
 What Linell’s more abstract model carries over from the more concrete study of “talk-
in-interaction”can be seen in his account of “what might constitute a ‘minimal 
communicative interaction’” as consisting of “minimally three steps”: 
 
“If speaker A utters something and thereby indicates a targeted understanding, then B 
must indicate his understanding of this by some responsive action, typically another 
utterance, and then A has to show her reaction to B’s response by yet another action 
(utterance)” (2009,  183).4 
 
 While the “adjacency pair” in CA  has the ontological status of a social norm, for 
Linell the dialogical character of the minimal interaction appears to have a more fundamental 
ontological status: 
 
                                                          
4
 Linell acknowledges that the “dialogical theory of the minimal interaction is of course not new”, with 
precursors in the work of G H Mead and with affinities in the “two move” framework of Herb Clark and the CA 
notion of “adjacency pair” (Linell 2009, 183-183). 
  “A definitional point in dialogism is the assumption that human nature and human 
life are constituted in interrelations with ‘the other’, that is in other-orientation. 
Humans are always interdependent with others, although the degree and kinds of 
interdependencies will of course vary with individuals, cultures and situations” (2009, 
13). 
 
 Furthermore, Linell appears to assume that this ‘other-orientation’ has an a priori 
status in human development:  
 
“That human nature, its ontology, is dialogical has in fact been substantiated by 
several empirical findings. One is that infants indulge in interaction virtually from 
their first moments in life …; thus, dialogicality must be biologically endowed” 
(2009,  30).  
 
Similarly: “An infant has a biologically endowed capacity for dialogue” (Linell 2005, 110). 
This “capacity for dialogue” is then extended to the entire communicational (and social) 
universe of human beings: “dialogicality is an attribute of human sense-making, that is, the 
dynamic processes, actions and practices in which meanings are contextually constituted in 
the interactions of human beings with others and environments” (Linell 2009, 30). 
 
 Despite many points of apparent convergence, then, Linell’s conception displays what 
is a key problem from an integrationist standpoint, namely building a social norm or 
“macrosocial proficiency” – in the shape of an interactional schema derived from talk – into 
“human nature” itself. It is one thing to say that as individuals we could not survive without 
others (so that we are immediately dependent on their actions towards us) but arguably going 
a little too far to argue that such interdependencies presuppose “a biologically endowed 
capacity for dialogue” or “other-orientation”. With such an argument, linguistic interaction 
(seen “abstractly”) shapes not only our view of communication but our conception of 
sociality in general as ultimately dependent on the possession of such linguistic capacities as 
part of our “biological endowment”.  
 
 
4. Edda Weigand’s “Mixed Game Model” 
 
 4.1. MGM and the “Dialogic Principle” 
 
Like Linell’s dialogical system, Edda Weigand’s MGM begins by equating communication 
and dialogue: “As a consequence of the premise that human beings are goal-directed beings, 
communication means dialogic interaction” (Weigand 2010,  76). Similarly, the scope of 
dialogic principles in Weigand’s hands are as sweeping for all things human as in Linell’s, 
although the two approaches differ in many particulars (including on Linell’s “other-
orientation”: Weigand 2010,  81). Thus, Weigand argues that it is “the ability to experience 
and negotiate meaning and understanding in dialogue which enables [human beings] to 
develop societies, institutions, complex cultural systems, or, in general, civilization” (2010,  
272).  
 
 Unlike in Linell, however, the MGM presents a whole philosophy of linguistic 
communication, cast in dialogic metalanguage, tailored to fit an overt ideological agenda, 
namely E O Wilson’s sociobiology (e.g., Weigand 2010, Chapter 2). A thorough critique of 
sociobiology is impossible here, although, like many scholars, I consider sociobiology (and 
its close relative, evolutionary psychology) to be a thoroughly implausible, pseudo-scientific 
enterprise (Rose, Lewontin and Kamin 1984; Smith 1996; Jones 2003). What is of interest 
and relevance, on the other hand, is the way in which sociobiologically influenced 
pronouncements on human nature and sociality are uncritically taken as base line premises 
for fundamental principles of human linguistic and communicational action. Such premises 
involve speculative claims about “genetic predispositions” (Weigand 2010, 68) underlying 
cultural behaviour, including “’learning rules’ which are differently shaped in kind and 
intensity in different individuals”, “some sort of ethics” and possibly “human beings’ desire 
to find something that can provide everlasting meaning to their transitory lives” (2010,  68). 
Furthermore, these genetic roots of cultural behaviour entail “cultural universals” (2010, 55), 
as evolutionary psychologists claim: “Culture”, as Weigand puts it, “can thus be grasped as 
part of inner human nature as well as of the external environment” (2010, 55). To see 
sociality and cultural activity in such terms means to place mental or intentional dispositions 
or states as causal factors in communicational activity and sociality more generally. Thus, as 
Weigand puts it, the “driving force of human action and behaviour results from human 
beings’ nature as intentional goal-directed beings. It is their needs and desires, purposes and 
interests as social individuals which cause them to act and provide the key to their behaviour” 
(2010,  62). 
  
In similar vein:  
 
“The key to the subsystems is the central driving force for human action, i.e. purposes 
and needs… It is human beings’ purposes, needs and desires in the world which call 
for structure. Consequently, the structure of the world is set up by human beings in 
their minds” (2010, 67). 
 
Or again:  
 
“The game of life as a complex mixed game is based on human beings’ abilities and 
needs, i.e. in the end on their basic mental states of belief and desire…  Beliefs and 
desires are the basis not only for individual actions but as well for complex actions in 
human affairs” (2010,  232).  
 
 In accordance with such assumptions, Weigand endorses a Searlean mentalistic 
account of social organization which attributes the key role in the emergence of social 
institutions to communicational intentionality, as we see in her account of “effectively 
running an institution” (2010, 234ff)5: “According to Searle …, it is the capacity to make 
something symbolize which creates institutions”.6 It is in this context of mentalistic 
assumptions that Weigand sees language and dialogue more specifically as addressing 
“purposes and needs” (2010, 67).   
 
 Consequently, the particular place and role allotted to dialogic principles in 
Weigand’s MGM follow from the sociobiologically inspired tendency to account for social 
behaviour in terms of beliefs, desires, interests or motivation, underpinned by cognitive 
predispositions of various kinds. Thus, Weigand claims that “the basic motivations for human 
action” are “self-assertion and respect for the other human being” (2010, 48), that people are 
“social individuals who act in their own interest but who need to respect the interests of the 
others” (2010, 62), or that “[h]uman beings as social individuals have a basic interest in being 
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 For an integrationist perspective on Searle and intentionality, see Chapter 6 of Harris (2012).  
6
 The lack of consideration of intentionality, indeed, was one of Searle’s main objections to the CA approach to  
turn-taking: “The rule for turn-taking  … doesn’t even have the appearance of being a rule since it doesn’t 
specify the relevant sort of intentional content that plays a causal role in the production of the behaviour” 
(Searle in Hutchby and Wooffit, 200, 50).  
 
 accepted by the community” (2010, 62), although “evolutionary considerations lead us to 
give priority to the self-interest of the individual” (2010, 61). These assumptions set the scene 
both for the general conception of dialogue which Weigand presents as well as the 
methodology of the MGM by which the concrete meanings of particular utterances 
(expressed in “speech acts”) will be derived from an abstract characterization of dialogue 
function known as the “Dialogic Principle” (2010, 79ff).  Though Weigand situates her 
approach to dialogic interaction within a broader treatment of “human action in general” 
(2010, 52), she is nevertheless committed to the irreducibly distinctive, and humanly 
fundamental, communicational character of language-as-action: “What is needed in order to 
grasp dialogic interaction is an action concept that is inherently connected with language 
itself. In a first attempt it can be understood as Austin’s ‘in-locution’” (2010, 76) (my 
emphasis). Such a language-based concept of action is necessary because we humans “do not 
live in a world of pre-established harmony, we live in different individual worlds which have 
to become related in dialogue in order to achieve an understanding over and above individual 
differences” (2010, 60). As she puts it: “From the outset human beings have to negotiate their 
positions with other fellow beings in dialogue” (2010, 48). We are, therefore, “epigenetically 
programmed as social beings who need dialogue for reasons of survival” (2010, 49). For 
Weigand, we are, as we were for Linell, “dialogic individuals” (2010, 59). And, once more, 
we note the theoretical trans-substantiation of dialogic principles from social norm to 
(hypothetical) flesh and blood (as “inner human nature”).  
 
 At the same time, the socio(biological) rationale for dialogue requires that there be a 
specific communicational function to dialogic interaction, referred to by Weigand as “the 
general purpose of dialogue” (2010, 59), namely “coming to an understanding about 
something”: “Dialogue means negotiating different positions and aims at coming to an 
understanding or agreement about these positions, be it in dialogic sequences of speech acts 
or in our minds” (2010, 59). As Weigand puts it elsewhere (2009: 509-510): “I consider 
‘coming to an understanding’ or ‘reaching a joint decision’ to be the general purpose of any 
dialogic language use”.  
 
 While this claim about a so-called “general purpose of dialogue” is contentious 
enough, where Weigand goes from there takes us to a whole new level of problematic. In 
effect, a bland and vaguely useful, though partial, generalization about specific episodes or 
strategies of linguistic interaction becomes a putative foundational matrix or generative 
 principle of communicational activity, or indeed, human sociality, more generally. The idea is 
that the abstract, intentional communicational function of dialogue (the “general purpose”) 
progressively sheds (or differentiates itself into) more concrete types or cases of dialogic 
interaction, creating a whole “speech act taxonomy”:  
 
 “We act and react in the action game because we want to ‘come to an understanding’. 
This general concept of the purpose or interactive claim allows us to derive different 
ways of coming to an understanding by differentiating the purpose” (2010, 141).   
 
In this way, the “individual action functions can be derived from this overall purpose of 
dialogue” (2010. 82). Futhermore, this entire perspective on the “general purpose” of 
dialogue along with its progressive differentiation is conceived in terms of the idealistic, a 
priori mentalism that is supposedly warranted by sociobiological “consilience”:   
 
“This issue of a dialogic speech act taxonomy is, in principle, an issue of the criteria 
which allow us to move from basic dialogic claims to more specialized ones. In order 
to achieve a consistent typology these criteria must be functional criteria and must be 
rooted in the human mind. It turns out that the various speech act types, in the end, 
draw on two different basic claims, namely a claim to truth and a claim to volition. 
These basic action claims rest on the basic mental states of belief and desire (Fodor 
1987: x). What has always been postulated and searched for, the connection between 
mind and language, is thus established by correlating basic mental states with basic 
speech act claims” (2010, 83).  
 
 Overall, then, it would be difficult to imagine an approach to communication that was 
more antithetical to integrationism. The MGM begins from a theoretician’s ideologically 
motivated abstraction from language use - “coming to an understanding” – and proceeds to 
derive the concrete linguistic world (of “speech acts”) from that abstraction via a speculative 
process worthy of the 19th century idealist heirs to the Hegelian tradition who attempted to 
derive the apple and the pear from “fruit in general”.7  
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 (Cf K Marx and F Engels, The Holy Family, 1845, https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1845/holy-
family/ch05.htm). 
 4.2  Edda Weigand’s MGM in integrationist perspective 
For integrationism, the fundamental problems of the MGM flow from the attempt to build a 
general communicational theory, and a perspective on human nature and sociality to match, 
from “an action concept that is inherently connected with language itself” (Weigand 2010, 
76). By contrast, integrationism starts from the following fact about our communicational 
experience: “If we wish to communicate with others, by whatever means, we have to find 
ways of integrating (albeit partially and temporarily) our activities with theirs and theirs with 
ours” (Harris 1996, 14). At root, then, the MGM appears to represent a version of “the fallacy 
of verbalism” (Harris 1996, 25), that is, the assumption that the communicational 
infrastructure of individual and collective life (not to mention human nature itself) must be 
linguistically defined or conceived. At the heart of this fallacy, in Harris’s view, is “a failure 
to grasp that language must first conform to the basic order of our communicational universe 
before words can in any way contribute to articulating it, or assist us in dealing with what lies 
beyond it” (1996, 25). Hence Harris’s brusque assessment of J L Austin's contribution to 
linguistic theory. “The main flaw” with the work, according to Harris, “is Austin's failure to 
consider to what extent being able to ‘do things with words’ is parasitic on being able to do 
things without them”. He goes on: “Doing things without words is what we need to 
understand first, before there is any chance of understanding what makes it possible to do 
things with words as well' (Harris 2013). 
 
 Furthermore, Harris argues elsewhere that the treatment Austin provides of “doing 
things with words” is too narrowly focussed on particular uses of language:  
 
“Too hasty an acceptance of Austin’s celebrated distinction between ‘performative’ 
and ‘constative’ might mislead the unwary into supposing that we are only doing 
things with words when we make apologies, promises, or perform some similar 
speech act of a more or less ritualized kind that has a recognized metalinguistic 
designation. But this is not the integrationist’s interpretation. Doing things with words 
involves integrating them into a communication process” (Harris 1998, 91).  
 
 Accordingly, Harris does not begin from any stipulations about the means, meanings, 
forms, intentions or functions of communication nor from any assumptions about 
hypothetical predispositions for negotiation or intentionality or about basic mental states of 
 belief or desire. The starting point, rather, is where our communicational experience must in 
fact begin, namely in the integration of activities  – between people and between people and 
their surrounding world – in which communicational means and values are created. It is only 
through this integration of the activities of real people in real circumstances that the 
communication processes necessary to their individual and collective survival, and whatever 
physical and mental habits and capacities these require, are built and progressed:  
 
“The particular forms which that integration may take will vary from case to case. An 
integrational approach does not presume to delimit in advance the scope of human 
communication, which history shows to be constantly open to innovation and 
development. Nor does it assume that there is any such thing as integrational 
proficiency or ‘communicative competence’ per se, i.e. a general ability which is 
variously applied in particular instances” (1996, 12). 
.   
 Similarly, Harris’s position diverges from the MGM as regards the motivations and 
driving forces of communicational activity. For Weigand, dialogue is needed because “[w]e 
do not live in a world of pre-established harmony, we live in different individual worlds 
which have to become related in dialogue in order to achieve an understanding over and 
above individual differences” (2010, 60). On this view, communicational order – and social 
and cultural organization in general – result from a general impulse to “come to an 
understanding” which is then differentiated according to circumstance and goal. For Harris, 
on the other hand, “we are born into a world which has a certain communicational 
infrastructure already in place. It is this infrastructure which allows us to participate straight 
away in communication with others” (1996, 24). He goes on: “Exactly how this 
communicational infrastructure is organized we do not grasp until much later. But its 
existence predetermines the range of communicational possibilities available to us both 
initially and for the rest of our lives. This range of possibilities structures our 
communicational universe” (1996, 24) though it is “an expanding universe, both for the 
individual and for the human race” (1996, 24). Harris explains that “this infrastructure 
comprises factors of just three kinds - “biomechanical”, “macrosocial” and “circumstantial” 
(1996, 28) - and that the “integration that is typically required in human communication 
depends on the possibility of coordinating sequences of activity involving factors of all three 
kinds” (1996, 28).  
 
  The communicational infrastructure is “already in place” not as a ready made system 
of signs, meanings or common values, nor as an abstract, impersonal structure to which the 
individual newcomer must succomb. It exists, rather, in the very personal shape of the 
concrete life activities of one’s immediate community, in their myriad interwoven and 
intersecting communication processes which enable the continuity of personhood and socially 
organized activity and from which novel processes can be creatively spun – in conformity 
with the “basic order” - to accommodate any newcomer’s needs and to “fit” the newcomer’s 
own developing forms of behaviour and sensitivity into lines of action which, at first, they 
can have no knowledge or awareness of. There is no sense, then, in attributing some naturally 
“dialogic” state or predisposition to the new born child; it is surely enough simply to say that 
the child’s survival presupposes the existence of a community that can provide for his or her 
needs. 
 
 Consequently, just as “communication in any form will impose on the participants 
requirements of a biomechanical, macrosocial and circumstantial nature and to organize their 
participation in such a way that these requirements do not conflict”, then “[l]anguage as a 
mode of communication is no more exempt from these requirements than any other mode of 
communication” (Harris 1998, 30). And precisely for that reason there can be no 
integrationist theory of dialogue (or “talk-in-interaction”) as such. Any communication 
process involving an episode of interaction in speech, for example, requires a time-bound 
integration of the participants’ bodily (biomechanical) activities of listening and speaking 
relative to the concrete circumstances of the interacting participants (their proximity, bodily 
orientation, other business going on, etc) and both presupposes – and develops – particular 
macrosocial proficiencies on the basis of repeated interactional experiences, including those 
proficiencies relating to the “norms” for conversational interaction. Studies of children’s 
development as communicators (e.g. Cowley 2007) show a substantial history of engagement 
in communication processes on the basis of earlier episodes of physical coordination and 
emotional attunement within which vocalizations identifiable as “language” (if at first only to 
the carers) play an increasingly important role in forms of interpersonal coordination and 
integration. But linguistic interaction in whatever modality always both presupposes and re-
produces the basic communicational “order” of integrational patterning on which the 
communicational infrastructure is built. And this is an inescapable fact about our 
communicational existence, whatever the goals or aims we might be pursuing in our 
 communicational engagements, including the kind of negotiation of different positions that 
might result in “coming to an understanding”:  
 
“It is not simply that engagement in communication tends as a consequence to 
integrate in various ways the lives of those who participate in it (as, for example, 
industrialization tends to promote a common urban way of life). Communication not 
only promotes but requires a systematic and complementary integration of the 
participants’ activities, both physical and mental” (Harris 1996, 13-14). 
 
 Furthermore the shape and dynamic of the local communication processes into which 
a child is inducted themselves connect with and engage an expanding circle of integrated 
patterns of activity and organization within the community and society at large which local 
participants may not, indeed may never, grasp and certainly have not intentionally brought 
about. In this way, the integration of communication processes, along with the unintended 
consequences of such integration, result in a communicational universe subject to constraints, 
imperatives and requirements which conflict dramatically – often murderously – with the 
needs, desires and purposes of its human agents. That is why for the integrationist, the 
starting point for any critical investigation of communicational activity must be the concrete 
communication process itself rather than abstract human “needs”, “purposes”, “mental states” 
or communicational functions supposedly expressed therein.  
 
 Similarly, the integrationist’s perspective is not that verbal discourse can be 
understood as deriving its specific content and meaning by differentiation of a mythical 
abstraction in the form of a general and primordial dialogical function (“coming to an 
agreement”). On the contrary, we inhabit a communicational universe organized not by 
dialogic principles but by the active construction of communication processes in which and 
around which dialogical interaction itself (if and when it occurs) must be anchored. 
Furthermore, the inter-linkage and coherence of particular integrational alignments and 
sequences is not established in the mind but established in practice through the actions 
themselves. 
 
 The term “communication process” in Harris, therefore, involves a much broader 
notion than dialogical or even “interactionist” approaches generally allow as it relates to all 
occasions in which activities are semiotically integrated between people or between people 
 and the world in which they act. Practical action and communication cannot, therefore, 
constitute separate “action principles” as in Weigand (2010). Similarly, communicationally 
organized collective practical activity, as is involved in real time team effort (at work, in 
sport, in musical performance etc), and which Weigand deems outside the scope of her 
“Dialogic Principle” (2010, 80), represents an absolutely fundamental type of communication 
process. 
 
 Setting aside its ideological framing, however, let us examine in more detail the 
distinctive “action principle” at work in the MGM. In contrast with Linell’s three-move 
“minimal communicative interaction”, Weigand prefers a two-move framework (like the CA 
adjacency pair). Thus, “The Dialogic Principle proper” (2010, 79) “provides a definition of 
dialogue as a sequence of action and reaction… Dialogue is therefore constituted by the 
interactive purpose of coming to an understanding which is based on the sequence of action 
and reaction” (2010, 82). 
 
She elaborates:  
 
“Action and reaction are not two actions of the same type which are arbitrarily 
connected and only formally distinguished by their position in the sequence. They are 
functionally different types of action, initiative and reactive, which are internally 
connected by their very action function” (2010: 80).  
 
And in further clarification:  
 
“Yet what is precisely the functional difference between action and reaction? To my 
mind, an initiative act makes a dialogic claim and the reactive act fulfils this very 
claim. ‘Fulfilling’ not only means giving a positive answer. In a very general sense, it 
means going into the initiative claim which can also be done by a negative reply or by 
an utterance that does not take a position but postpones the decision. What is crucial is 
the internal functional relationship between action and reaction that is created by the 
very claim itself which is on the one hand, made and, on the other, fulfilled” (2010, 
81).  
 
  Elsewhere, she notes: “The integration of components does not come about by the 
addition of parts; integration means the interaction of components which are interconnected 
from the very beginning” (2009, 131). This interconnectedness in turn implies an intention to 
communicate on the part of initiator and a recognition and fulfilment of that intention in 
response: 
 
“In a model of dialogic interaction, texts or words represent communicative means 
which are intentionally used by speakers. If they are used without intention, for 
instance, out of absent-mindedness, they cannot in any way be considered as actors or 
as communicative means” (2009, 131). 
 
 In a nutshell, then, we have an intentional model of communicational transmission in 
the Dialogic Principle, one subjected to critical examination in Harris (1996). However, in the 
description of the interdependent dialogic functions of action and reaction there appears to be 
a surprising parallel with Harris’s own description of integrational functions: communication 
minimally depends on an “integration of two sequences of activity, the second of which 
complements the first” (Harris 1996: 71). More specifically, the “complementation” involved 
in integration may be thought of in terms of a circumstantially relevant relationship between 
communicational initiative and communicational sequel, where complementation “requires 
that the second contribute to that sequence of events which the first is interpreted as 
projecting” (1996, 70).  
 Closer inspection, though, reveals a key contrast. For Weigand, the “internal 
functional relationship” between action and reaction is “created by the very claim itself which 
is on the one hand, made and, on the other fulfilled”, these functional components being 
“interconnected from the very beginning” by the intrinsic intentionality of the dialogic 
process. Harris, by contrast, sets no such requirements as to intentional “fulfilment” or 
reciprocity in the process: activities “may be said to be integrated when in combination they 
produce results which could not have been achieved by any of those single activities 
independently” (1996, 70). Thus, the “communicational sequel” does not “fulfill” but 
“complements” the “communicational initiative” in the sense that it contributes “to that 
sequence of events which the first is interpreted as projecting” (1996, 70). Note, firstly, that 
we are dealing with “a sequence of events” rather than a speech act (or “first pair part” in 
CA). Secondly, a question arises as to who is doing the “projecting”. For Weigand, the 
 initiator of the dialogic interaction projects a “claim” which the respondent must “fulfil”. For 
Harris, on the other hand, the relevant projection is done by the author of the sequel. The 
“communicational initiative” may therefore be an action (or event) performed or merely 
happening with, in principle, any or no communicational intent whatsoever, the “sequel” 
being an action which in effect makes a “coherent sequence” (in some line of action of the 
respondent) out of the integration of the two. As Harris puts it: “Integration ... is the bringing 
together of diverse elements or activities into a coherent synthesis” (2009, 163).  
 
 Furthermore, this treatment extends to “cases where no other person is involved”, in 
which case “the communication process often consists in constructing an integrated sequel to 
an observation of our own” (Harris 1996, 63). Harris takes Robinson Crusoe’s “reaction to 
finding the footprint” (of Friday) on the beach to illustrate the integrational 
“complementation” involved in this particular communication process: 
 
 “It does not occur to the castaway to consider whether this is an intentional or a non-
intentional sign, and indeed in the circumstances that does not matter. What matters is 
that he now knows that someone else is – or has been – on the island” (1996, 48).  
 
 There can be no general grounds or criteria in principle, therefore, for determining (or 
stipulating) what may count as integrational complementation (as a sequel) in concrete 
communicational episodes since, as Harris puts it, “circumstances alter cases” (1996, 69). In 
other words, what counts as complementation in the context of interpersonal interaction will 
depend on the nature of the communication process which the participants are jointly creating 
(cooperatively or uncooperatively) -  whether singing in harmony, swapping improvised 
choruses in a jazz combo, passing water buckets along a line, paying for a meal, following a 
map, holding open a door, or having a conversation.  
 
 Any objection to the effect that the principle of integrational complementarity 
dissolves the social world into a chaos of independent and unharmonized behaviours of 
separate individuals fails to note the implications of Harris’s characterization of the 
communicational infrastructure both in terms of the relationship between “internal” and 
“external” integration of communication processes noted above and, more specifically, the 
crucial role of circumstantial factors in “anchor[ing] the contextualization of communication” 
(1996,  30). In that light, the close communicational coordination and synchronization of 
 interpersonal activities in teams or en masse can be understood firstly as a function of the 
concrete relations of interdependence between individual people but secondly as a function of 
the restrictions imposed on their communicational creativity, on their freedom of movement 
and action generally, by circumstantial factors - whether physical in the broadest sense, 
financial, moral etc -  over which they may have little say or control. 
 
4.3 Dialogic interaction and “integrational binding” 
Against these general integrationist considerations, the “Dialogic Principle” of the MGM 
might simply be seen as an extrapolation from common patterns of integrational 
complementation one might describe as instances of  “integrational binding”. Such patterns 
inevitably arise with the development of macrosocial proficiencies over sequences of 
communicational episodes as a result of which, subject to circumstance, integrational 
complementations or sequels can be reliably projected from mutually recognisable prior 
initiating moves, as in the familiar “adjacency pair” format.  
 
Such cases appear to demonstrate an unexceptional and ubiquitous ability on the part of 
cooperating interlocutors to understand and “fulfill” their respective communicational 
intentions, something that is often (as in the MGM) considered to be a distinctive feature of 
linguistic interaction. Consider, however, daily routines which do not involve words at all. 
Consider the nurse who, before leaving for work, puts his or her uniform on, packs lunch, 
pockets money, puts shoes on, etc. i.e. enacts a daily “getting ready for work” communication 
process, a whole “internally integrated” and locally intelligible “bubble” of 
communicationally organized activity. At the same time, of course, this activity itself only 
has the meaning it does as a (back) projection of the nurse’s subsequent lines of action in 
which the objects or processes assembled or executed in the preparatory bubble will be 
variously deployed or called on during the working day (at the bus stop, on the ward, in the 
canteen). The activity of eating lunch, for example, will ultimately complement the lunch 
making “initiative” as its “enactive sequel”; conversely, lunch will be made carefully and 
deliberately – with focussed intent – to enable the subsequent “complementary” act of 
consumption. In this way, through repeated practice, the projected sequel impacts back 
through the whole communication process which it complements, thereby “binding” the 
design and construction of the communicative initiative ever more tightly into the projected 
sequence of integrational complementation.  
  
 From this simple case a number of implications follow. Firstly, the “inner functional 
relationship” of the Dialogic Principle can be seen as merely an instance of broader patterns 
of (non verbal) integrational complementation. Secondly, we see that it would harm our 
overall view of the communicational organization of social life if we examined the local 
“getting ready for work” bubble – however smoothly, deliberately, intelligibly and reliably 
designed it may be “in itself” - separately from and independently of the externally integrated 
activities and processes which it both presupposes and prepares and serves. And thirdly, 
while the “getting ready for work” case speaks strongly of the role of intention, of deliberate 
preparation, in the “binding” of communication processes through productive sequences of 
action, other cases show more clearly that the locally intelligible design of an internally 
integrated “bubble” can come together without any specific intent at all due to the way in 
which the criterial properties or specifications of integrational sequels can work back, due to 
countless independent and ad hoc adjustments, to foist on participants the circumstantial 
conditions in which their initiating actions must be performed. Smith, for example, examines 
how a “brutal labor regime” for Shenzhen workers ensues as “part of the hidden price for 
Apple’s super profits and Western consumers’ access to the latest high-tech gadgets” (2016, 
23):  
 
“On an assembly line in the Shenzhen Longhua plant, a worker described her work to 
precise seconds: ‘I take a motherboard from the line, scan the logo, put it in an anti-
static-electricity bag, stick on a label, and place it on the line. Each of these tasks 
takes two seconds. Every ten seconds I finish five tasks’” (Ngai and Chan 2012 in 
Smith 2016,  24). 
 
 While individuals therefore always exercise some creative freedom of action, they do 
so within limits set by the necessity (voluntarily assumed or coerced) to “aim” their current 
communicational encounter towards an outcome or end product which others can “fit” into 
the opening leading to the next bubble in the chain of complementation, and so on. The final 
outcome of the processual chain thereby moulds the circumstances and parameters within 
which communicational creativity (not to mention livelihood, lifestyle and personal identity) 
may be displayed or enacted. In such a fashion are whole spheres of activity “reverse 
engineered” or back projected from their empirical outcomes in a process which does not at 
all depend on an overseeing authority or collective intentionality but results from the 
 unplanned (and unexamined) confluence and collision of streams of communication 
processes in which human needs, purposes and aspirations may be ruthlessly chewed up and 
spat out. Much if not everything we do is subject to such circumstantial “binding” without us 




I have attempted to show that approaches to communication in general which give 
ontological or methodological primacy to linguistic interaction – seen now “concretely” as 
“talk”, now “abstractly” as “dialogic principle” – appear to carry the twin risks of 
mystification of communication proficiencies, rooted at least in part in an unexamined 
linguistic reflexivity, and of the dis-integration of the social world into which our 
communicational experiences and actions are inseparably intervowen. In this connection, 
Harris’s cautionary words on the subject of general theories of communication are worth 
noting:  
 
 “Models which have been designed with certain specific cases and comparisons in 
mind (to which a tacit priority is thus accorded in dealing with other cases) may 
perhaps have a limited validity (i.e.in dealing just with such cases as provided the 
prototype). But their application across the entire gamut of human communication 
invariably becomes problematic” (1996, 6). 
 
Our communicational experiences in local settings or activities are in effect experiences of 
connecting to and contributing to the (re-)creation of a wider communicational infrastructure 
through which we are sustained (and sometimes destroyed). To begin from, or indeed to stop 
at, the boundaries of such meaningful communicational experience - in the shape of active 
“sense-making” (Linell), “intersubjectivity” (Schegloff), local “intelligibility” and 
“transparency” (Goodwin), or “coming to an understanding” (Weigand) - is therefore to take 
the risk of obscuring or fragmenting the communicational universe which we inhabit, to 
which we contribute and which we may also wish to change. Consequently, the ghost of 
segregationism, in the shape of Harris’s “fallacy of verbalism”, continues to haunt, at times 
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